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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20050746-CA 
JOHNNIE B. MILLSAP Dist.No. 041901845 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in the 
Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated February 4, 2005. The 
Defendant pled guilty to Driving under the influence of alcohol, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2004). The plea was entered 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendant was 
sentenced to serve one year on this case. It was ordered to run concurrent to a zero to 
five sentence he received on a separate case. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DOES THE DEFENDANT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
DUI STATUTE? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law and therefore no deference 
should be given to the district court's ruling. See, Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 
455 456 (Utah 1989)("Because the resolution of this case depends entirely on 
questions of law, we accord no deference to the rulings of the . . . district courts . ..") 
I. IS U.C.A. §41-6-44 UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law which an appellate 
court should review for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, 
which we review for correctness." State v. Ansari, 100 P.3d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004). 
This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant's attorney filed a motion 
to declare the statute unconstitutional. (R. 26-27). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 41-6-44(2004)- In 2001, section 41-6-44(2)(a) read; 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the personrhas sufficient alcohol in his body that a 
chemical test given within two hours of the alleged operation or 
physical control shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater; 
Section 41-6-44 was amended in 2002. This section now reads; 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath 
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alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Driving under the influence 
with priors, a third degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44. (R. 001). His 
attorney filed a motion to declare Utah's DUI statute unconstitutional with an 
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities. (R. 20-27). The State 
objected to Defendant's motion. (R. 28-32). After a hearing and further briefing the 
trial court denied Defendant's motion. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
Order were prepared and signed by the Honorable W. Brent West. (R. 59-61). The 
Court ruled that the Defendant did not have standing to challenge the DUI statute, 
that the statute does not create a conclusive presumption, and that the statute was not 
vague or overbroad. (R. 59-61). 
After the denial of his motion, the Defendant entered a into a plea agreement 
where he pled guilty to an unrelated third degree felony DUI and the charge in this 
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case was reduced to a Class A misdemeanor. (R. 91-92). The plea was entered 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendant was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. His sentence on this case was ordered to run 
concurrent with his prison sentence. (R. 094-95) The Sentence, Judgment and 
Commitment was signed on August 3, 2005. (R. 094-95). A timely notice of appeal 
was filed on September 1, 2005. (R. 116). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 27, 2004, the Defendant was stopped by a police officer and 
eventually cited for DUI in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44(2004). The Defendant 
submitted to an intoxilyzer test and had a blood alcohol content of .099. The test was 
performed within one hour of the Defendant's stop. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Section 41-6-44 of the Utah Code is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The 
statute prohibits anyone from being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle and 
then subsequently having a blood alcohol level in excess of .08. There is nothing in 
the statute that requires a nexus between the driving and the subsequent chemical 
test. The way the statute is written someone is guilty of a DUI when they are seen 
driving a vehicle one day and then the next day they submit to a chemical test that 
showed their blood alcohol content was in excess of .08. The statute is so vague that 
a person of ordinary intelligence would not know what specific conduct is prohibited. 
For these reasons, the statute is vague on its face and the Defendant respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse his conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE UTAH'S 
DUI STATUTE. 
The Defendant is challenging the constitutionality of U.C.A. §41-6-44 on its 
face. 
The State argued and the trial court ruled that Defendant does not have 
standing to challenge Utah's DUI statute. (See, R. 028-32, 59-61). For a defendant 
to have standing he must show "some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or 
her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Provo City v. Willden, 768 
P.2d 455 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted). A defendant needs to have more than a 
"mere allegation of an adverse impact." State v. Ansari, 100 P.3d 231, 240 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004). 
If a defendant doesn't have a personal stake in the controversy, "then the 
defendant would still have standing if there were no challenger with a more direct 
interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues." Id. (quotations 
omitted). In addition, a defendant may have standing "if the court determines that the 
issues raised by the [complainant] are of sufficient public importance in and of 
themselves to grant . . . standing." Id. (citations and quotations omitted)(alterations 
in original). 
In the case at bar, the Defendant has standing to challenge U.C.A. §41-6-44 
under any of the three theories. First, the Defendant has a personal stake in the 
controversy. He was charged with a third degree felony and eventually pled guilty to 
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a class A misdemeanor in this case and to a third degree felony in a separate case for 
violating the same statute. In the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
the court ruled that the Defendant didn't have standing because the intoxilyzer test 
was performed within an hour of the time the Defendant operated his vehicle. The 
Court further found that someone who had a more significant period of time between 
operating the vehicle and taking an intoxilyzer test would be in a better position to 
challenge the DUI statute. (R. 59-60, Finding of Fact #1). 
Even if this Court agrees with the trial court and finds that someone with a 
longer time period between the driving and the test would be in a better position to 
challenge the statute it should still find that Defendant has standing. That is because 
this matter is one of sufficient importance. Standing should be granted when "the 
constitutionally protected interests infringed . . . are so important that their protection 
need not await the perfect plaintiff." Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d at 457. 
Furthermore, the Defendant faces the potential of future prosecution and 
cannot conform his conduct to the requirements of the law as it is currently written. 
If the statute is not found to be unconstitutional this Defendant would be forced to 
give up drinking or give up driving. Additionally, this Defendant potentially faces 
prosecution for each instance he has driven in the past prior to March 27, 2004 when 
the test was administered since the test would be "a subsequent chemical test" that 
establishes a breath alcohol level in excess of .08. 
Thousands of people are prosecuted each year for violating the State's DUI 
statute. In addition, the statute is one that is important for public safety. If the statute 
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is constitutionally flawed it is important that the issue be addressed in a timely 
fashion so that the rights and protections for Utah's citizens will not be affected. 
II. U.C.A. §41-6-44 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
U.C.A. §41-6-44 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. "[V]agueness 
questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute 
adequately notices the proscribed conduct." State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 191-
92 (Utah 1987). A statute needs to give explicit instructions concerning its 
prohibitions. A "statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to 
inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 
50, 51 (Utah 1982)(footnote omitted). 
In 2002, Utah's DUI statute was amended. The amendment deleted specific 
language with very vague language that allows the State to prosecute anyone who 
both drives a vehicle and consumes alcohol even if the two activities are not 
connected. 
In 2001, section 41-6-44(2)(a) read; 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test 
given within two hours of the alleged operation or 
physical control shows that the person has a blood or 
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; 
U.C.A. §41-6-44(2)(a)(2001). Under the old statute the language clearly tied 
being in actually physical control of a motor vehicle with the prohibition of having a 
blood alcohol concentration of above .08. It required that the test be administered 
7 
within two hours of the driving. This is no longer required. Section 41-6-44 was 
amended in 2002. This section now reads; 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: 
(ii) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
U.C.A. §41-6-44(2)(a)(2004). Under the current statute there is no nexus between 
the driving and having a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater. A test may be 
given one hour, two hours, one day or one week after the individual was in actual 
physical control of a vehicle. Under this statute the person is guilty of DUI 
regardless of how much time elapsed between the driving and the intoxication. There 
is nothing in this portion of the statute that requires the person to have been under the 
influence at the time that he or she was in actual physical control of the motor 
vehicle. 
The language in this statue is so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence 
could not determine the specific conduct that is illegal. "The void-for vagueness 
doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(quotations and 
citations omitted). It's hard to imagine a statue that is more open to arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement than this one. The statute makes it so that anyone who 
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consumes alcohol to the point that they reach the level of .08 is prohibited from 
operating a vehicle at any time since all that has to be shown is that a person drove a 
vehicle and had a blood alcohol concentration of above .08. There is nothing in this 
statute that requires a nexus between the driving and being under the influence of 
alcohol. Therefore, this statute is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
towards anyone who consumes alcohol in the State. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 41-6-44 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The statute fails to 
give adequate notice in sufficiently explicit terms at to what conduct is prohibited. 
Under the statute a person could be convicted for DUI when they consumed alcohol a 
week or a month after they drove the vehicle. For these reasons, the Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to declare the statute unconstitutional and reverse his 
conviction. 
DATED this J6_'day of February, 2006. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark 
Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th 
Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this _ day of 
February, 2006. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ulD 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOHNNIE BORDEN MILLSAP, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901845 FS 
Judge: W BRENT WEST 
Date: August 3, 2 0 05 
PRESENT 
Clerk: pama 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GALE, GARY L 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 12, 1952 
Video 
Tape Number: W8-3-05 Tape Count: 10:28 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 06/15/2005 No Contest 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The one year on this case to run concurrent with the 0-5 years on 
case 041907049 and to be served at the Utah State Prison. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant be 
granted credit for the time he has served and if he is paroled that 
he may be compacted to the State of Mississippi. 
004 
Case No: 041901845 
Date: Aug 03, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 1 year(s) 
W BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
Paqe 2 (last) 
(M Of" 
ADDENDUM B 
BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN # 9777 oLCOND DiSTRJCT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 2085 FEB 22 P M IM 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHNNIE BORDEN MILLSAP 
DOB: 11/12/1952 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
Case No. 041901845 
Judge W. BRENT WEST 
On October 6, 2004, this matter came before the Court for a hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and Suppress. Gary Gale, representing Defendant, and Brandon Maynard, 
representing the State, were present. After receiving memorandums and hearing oral arguments 
from both parties, the Court requested supplemental briefing. The State, now represented by 
Branden Miles, filed an additional brief on January 26, 2005. The Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant has no standing to challenge the Driving Under the Influence statute, § 
41-6-44, because his factual situation and his concerns about the potentially 
significant time difference between operating a vehicle and taking an Intoxilyzer 
test is not applicable in his case since the officer tested him within an hour of 
operating his vehicle. A person who has a more significant period of time 
between the operation of a vehicle and the taking of an Intoxilyzer test would be 
better suited to challenge the DUI statute. 
2. The Utah State Legislature has the authority to change the DUI statute and this 
Court must pay deference to their decision to change how the prosecution may 
prove a DUI in Utah. 
3. The Legislature intended the change in the DUI statute, which now allows a 
person who registers a .08 or greater at the time of the test to be charged, to punish 
the person who drinks alcohol and then tries to drive home before his or her 
breath alcohol level rises above a .08. 
4. The DUI statute does not create a conclusive or irrefutable presumption that a 
person who takes an Intoxilyzer with a result .08 or higher and has operated a 
vehicle at some time in the significant past is guilty of DUI. 
5. At trial, the State has the burden to prove a nexus between the operation of a 
motor vehicle and the taking of an Intoxilyzer test. 
6. The State's burden to prove the connection between taking an Intoxilyzer test and 
operating a motor vehicle never shifts to the Defendant. 
7. Though the burden does not shift, a defendant may challenge the nexus between 
the operation of a vehicle and the taking of an Intoxilyzer test. 
8. The DUI Statute is not vague or overly broad because reasonable people can 
identify what behavior the statute prohibits. 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The Defendant does not have standing to challenge the DUI statute. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44 (2004). The DUI Statute does not create a conclusive 
presumption, nor is it vague or overbroad. 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Suppress is Denied. 
DATED this J l _ day of fiE£gU*M , 2005. 
Prepared by: 
BrandenB. Miles 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Gary Gale 
fa. S&ft^ 
W. BRENT WEST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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